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Abstract
Adversarial training has proved to be competitive against supervised learning
methods on computer vision tasks. However, studies have mainly been confined
to generative tasks such as image synthesis. In this paper, we apply adversarial
training techniques to the discriminative task of learning a steganographic algo-
rithm. Steganography is a collection of techniques for concealing the existence
of information by embedding it within a non-secret medium, such as cover texts
or images. We show that adversarial training can produce robust steganographic
techniques: our unsupervised training scheme produces a steganographic algorithm
that competes with state-of-the-art steganographic techniques. We also show that
supervised training of our adversarial model produces a robust steganalyzer, which
performs the discriminative task of deciding if an image contains secret information.
We define a game between three parties, Alice, Bob and Eve, in order to simulta-
neously train both a steganographic algorithm and a steganalyzer. Alice and Bob
attempt to communicate a secret message contained within an image, while Eve
eavesdrops on their conversation and attempts to determine if secret information is
embedded within the image. We represent Alice, Bob and Eve by neural networks,
and validate our scheme on two independent image datasets, showing our novel
method of studying steganographic problems is surprisingly competitive against
established steganographic techniques.
1 Introduction
Steganography and cryptography both provide methods for secret communication. Authenticity
and integrity of communications are central aims of modern cryptography. However, traditional
cryptographic schemes do not aim to hide the presence of secret communications. Steganography
conceals the presence of a message by embedding it within a communication the adversary does
not deem suspicious. Recent details of mass surveillance programs have shown that meta-data of
communications can lead to devastating privacy leakages1. NSA officials have stated that they “kill
people based on meta-data” [8]; the mere presence of a secret communication can have life or death
consequences even if the content is not known. Concealing both the content as well as the presence
of a message is necessary for privacy sensitive communication.
Steganographic algorithms are designed to hide information within a cover message such that the
cover message appears unaltered to an external adversary. A great deal of effort is afforded to
designing steganographic algorithms that minimize the perturbations within a cover message when
a secret message is embedded within, while allowing for recovery of the secret message. In this
work we ask if a steganographic algorithm can be learned in an unsupervised manner, without
human domain knowledge. Note that steganography only aims to hide the presence of a message.
1See EFF’s guide: https://www.eff.org/files/2014/05/29/unnecessary_and_
disproportionate.pdf.
Thus, it is nearly always the case that the message is encrypted prior to embedding using a standard
cryptographic scheme; the embedded message is therefore indistinguishable from a random string.
The receiver of the steganographic image will then decode to reveal the ciphertext of the message and
then decrypt using an established shared key.
For the unsupervised design of steganographic techniques, we leverage ideas from the field of
adversarial training [7]. Typically, adversarial training is used to train generative models on tasks
such as image generation and speech synthesis. We design a scheme that aims to embed a secret
message within an image. Our task is discriminative, the embedding algorithm takes in a cover image
and produces a steganographic image, while the adversary tries to learn weaknesses in the embedding
algorithm, resulting in the ability to distinguish cover images from steganographic images.
The success of a steganographic algorithm or a steganalysis technique over one another amounts
to ability to model the cover distribution correctly [5]. So far, steganographic schemes have used
human-based rules to ‘learn’ this distribution and perturb it in a way that disrupts it least. However,
steganalysis techniques commonly use machine learning models to learn the differences in distribu-
tions between the cover and steganographic images. Based on this insight we pursue the following
hypothesis:
Hypothesis: Machine learning is as capable as human-based rules for the task of modeling the cover
distribution, and so naturally lends itself to the task of designing steganographic algorithms, as well
as performing steganalysis.
In this paper, we introduce the first steganographic algorithm produced entirely in an unsupervised
manner, through a novel adversarial training scheme. We show that our scheme can be successfully
implemented in practice between two communicating parties, and additionally that with supervised
training, the steganalyzer, Eve, can compete against state-of-the-art steganalysis methods. To the best
of our knowledge, this is one of the first real-world applications of adversarial training, aside from
traditional adversarial learning applications such as image generation tasks.
2 Related work
2.1 Adversarial learning
Two recent designs have applied adversarial training to cryptographic and steganographic problems.
Abadi and Andersen [2] used adversarial training to teach two neural networks to encrypt a short
message, that fools a discriminator. However, it is hard to offer an evaluation to show that the
encryption scheme is computationally difficult to break, nor is there evidence that this encryption
scheme is competitive against readily available public key encryption schemes. Adversarial training
has also been applied to steganography [4], but in a different way to our scheme. Whereas we seek to
train a model that learns a steganographic technique by itself, Volkhonskiy et al’s. work augments the
original GAN process to generate images which are more susceptible to established steganographic
algorithms. In addition to the normal GAN discriminator, they introduce a steganalyzer that receives
examples from the generator that may or may not contain secret messages. The generator learns to
generate realistic images by fooling the discriminator of the GAN, and learns to be a secure container
by fooling the steganalyzer. However, they do not measure performance against state-of-the-art
steganographic techniques making it difficult to estimate the robustness of their scheme.
2.2 Steganography
Steganography research can be split into two subfields: the study of steganographic algorithms and
the study of steganalyzers. Research into steganographic algorithms concentrates on finding methods
to embed secret information within a medium while minimizing the perturbations within that medium.
Steganalysis research seeks to discover methods to detect such perturbations. Steganalysis is a binary
classification task: discovering whether or not secret information is present with a message, and so
machine learning classifiers are commonly used as steganalyzers.
Least significant bit (LSB) [16] is a simple steganographic algorithm used to embed a secret message
within a cover image. Each pixel in an image is made up of three RGB color channels (or one for
grayscale images), and each color channel is represented by a number of bits. For example, it is
common to represent a pixel in a grayscale image with an 8-bit binary sequence. The LSB technique
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Figure 1: (a) Diagram of the training game. (b) How two parties, Carol and David, use the scheme in practice:
(1) Two parties establish a shared key. (2) Carol trains the scheme on a set of images. Information about model
weights, architecture and the set of images used for training is encrypted under the shared key and sent to David,
who decrypts to create a local copy of the models. (3) Carol then uses the Alice model to embed a secret
encrypted message, creating a steganographic image. This is sent to David, who uses the Bob model to decode
the encrypted message and subsequently decrypt.
then replaces the least significant bits of the cover image by the bits of the secret message. By only
manipulating the least significant bits of the cover image, the variation in color of the original image
is minimized. However, information from the original image is always lost when using the LSB
technique, and is known to be vulnerable to steganalysis [6].
Most steganographic schemes for images use a distortion function that forces the embedding process
to be localized to parts of the image that are considered noisy or difficult to model. Advanced
steganographic algorithms attempt to minimize the distortion function between a cover image, C,
and a steganographic image, C ′,
d(C,C ′) = f(C,C ′) · |C − C ′|
It is the choice of the function f , the cost of distorting a pixel, which changes for different stegano-
graphic algorithms.
HUGO [18] is considered to be one of the most secure steganographic techniques. It defines a
distortion function domain by assigning costs to pixels based on the effect of embedding some
information within a pixel, the space of pixels is condensed into a feature space using a weighted
norm function. WOW (Wavelet Obtained Weights) [9] is another advanced steganographic method
that embeds information into a cover image according to regions of complexity. If a region of an
image is more texturally complex than another, the more pixel values within that region will be
modified. Finally, S-UNIWARD [10] proposes a universal distortion function that is agnostic to the
embedding domain. However, the end goal is much the same: to minimize this distortion function,
and embed information in noisy regions or complex textures, avoiding smooth regions of the cover
images. In Section 4.2, we compare out results against a state-of-the-art steganalyzer, ATS [13]. ATS
uses labeled data to build artificial training sets of cover and steganographic images, and is trained
using an SVM with a Gaussian kernel. They show that this technique outperforms other popular
steganalysis tools.
3 Steganographic adversarial training
This section discusses our steganographic scheme, the models we use and the information each
party wishes to conceal or reveal. After laying this theoretical groundwork, we present experiments
supporting our claims.
3.1 Learning objectives
Our training scheme involves three parties: Alice, Bob and Eve. Alice sends a message to Bob, Eve
can eavesdrop on the link between Alice and Bob and would like to discover if there is a secret
message embedded within their communication. In classical steganography, Eve (the Steganalyzer)
is passed both unaltered images, called cover images, and images with secret messages embedded
within, called steganographic images. Given an image, Eve places a confidence score of how likely
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this is a cover or steganographic image. Alice embeds a secret message within the cover image,
producing a steganographic image, and passes this to Bob. Bob knows the embedding process and so
can recover the message. In our scheme, Alice, Bob and Eve are neural networks. Alice is trained to
learn to produce a steganographic image such that Bob can recover the secret message, and such that
Eve can do no better than randomly guess if a sample is a cover or steganographic image.
The full scheme is depicted in Figure 1a: Alice receives a cover image, C, and a secret encrypted
message, M , as inputs. Alice outputs a steganographic image, C ′, which is given to both Bob and
Eve. Bob outputs M ′, the secret message he attempts to recover from C ′. We say Bob performs
perfectly if M = M ′. In addition to the steganographic images, Eve also receives the cover images.
Given an input X , Eve outputs the probability, p, that X = C. Alice tries to learn an embedding
scheme such that Eve always outputs p = 12 . We do not train Eve to maximize her prediction error,
since she can then simply flip her decision and perform with perfect classification accuracy. Figure 1b
shows how the scheme should be used in pratice if two people wish to communicate a steganographic
message using our scheme. The cost of sending the encrypted model information from Carol to David
is low, with an average of 70MB. Note that in Figure 1b, steps (1) and (2), the set-up of the shared key
and sharing of model information, is perfomed offline. We assume, as is common in cryptographic
research, that this initial set-up phase is not visible to an adversary.
At the beginning of training, a human can easily separate cover images from steganographic images,
as Alice has not learned yet how to embed the secret message such that there is no visible difference
in the cover image. However, we train Eve much like a discriminator in a GAN, where we tie her
predictive power to the embedding capacity of Alice. When Alice produces a steganographic image
that does not resemble the cover image, Eve does not have the ability to perfectly separate cover from
steganographic images. As training continues, Eve becomes better at her task, but then so does Alice
as her weights are updated, in part, based on the loss of Eve.
Similarly to Abadi and Andersen [2], we let θA, θB , θC denote the parameters of Alice, Bob and Eve,
respectively. We write A(θA, C,M) for Alice’s output on C and M , B(θb, C ′) for Bob’s output on
C ′, and E(θE , C, C ′) for Eve’s output on C and C ′. Let LA, LB , LC denote the loss of Alice, Bob
and Eve, respectively. Then, we have the following relations:
B(θb, C
′) = B(θb, A(θA, C,M))
E(θE , C, C
′) = E(θE , C,A(θA, C,M))
We set Bob’s loss (the secret message reconstruction loss), to be the Euclidean distance between M
and M ′:
LB(θA, θB ,M,C) = d(M,B(θb, C
′))
= d(M,B(θb, A(θA, C,M))
= d(M,M ′)
As is common with GAN discriminator implementations, we set the Eve’s loss to be sigmoid cross
entropy loss:
LE(θA, θE , C, C
′) = −y · log(E(θE , x))
− (1− y) · log(1− E(θE , x)),
where y = 0 if x = C ′ and y = 1 if x = C. Alice’s loss is given as a weighted sum of Bob’s loss,
Eve’s loss on steganographic images, and an additional reconstructive loss term:
LA(θA, C,M) = λA · d(C,C ′) + λB · LB
+ λE · LE(θE , C ′),
where d(C,C ′) is the Euclidean distance between the cover image and the steganographic image,
and λA, λB , λE ∈ R define the weight given to each respective loss term.
Our goal is not only to explore whether neural networks can produce steganographic embedding
algorithms in an unsupervised manner, but whether they are competitive against steganographic
algorithms like HUGO, WOW and S-UNIWARD, that have been designed by steganography experts.
We did not intend to encode a specific algorithm within the neural network, rather we would like to
give the networks the opportunity to devise their own.
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(a) Cover images. (b) Steganographic images
(0.1bpp).
(c) Steganographic images
(0.4bpp).
Figure 2: Cover and steganographic images from the celebA dataset, with embedding rates of 0.1bpp and
0.4bpp.
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(a) Alice, Bob and Eve error for 0.1bpp.
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(b) Alice, Bob and Eve error for 0.4bpp.
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(c) Bob decoding success for 0.1bpp.
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(d) Bob decoding success for 0.4bpp.
Figure 3: Results on celebA dataset at an embedding rate of 0.1bpp and 0.4bpp.
3.2 Architecture
Alice (Steganographic Encoder). Alice accepts as input a cover image and a random n-bit binary
message. The cover image is flattened and concatenated with the secret message, which is then fed
into the neural network. We would like the locality of the embedding process to be learned instead of
fixed; the first layer is fully connected to the next, allowing the secret message to be combined with
any region of the cover image. We then reshape to 4× 4× I · 8, where I is width of the cover image.
Each of the next four layers are a sequence of upsampling fractionally-strided convolutions, batch
normalization and ReLU [17], except for the final layer where tanh [12] is used as the activation
function.
Bob (Steganographic Decoder). Bob accepts as input the steganographic image output by Alice.
Bob uses a deep convolutional architecture to extract the important bits from the output of Alice.
It is made up of four fractionally-strided convolutions and one final fully connected layer. Leaky
ReLU [15] is used in all but the final layer, where tanh is used. Batch normalization is applied at each
layer.
Eve (Steganalyzer). Eve accepts as input both cover images and steganographic images. Eve has a
similar architecture to Bob but uses the sigmoid activation function instead of tanh at the final layer
to output probabilities from the logits.
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4 Experiments
As a proof of concept, we implemented our adversarial training scheme on two image datasets:
celebrity faces in the wild (celebA) [14] and a standard steganography research dataset, BOSS2.
We concatenate an n-bit random message, with each sample of each dataset. We vary the size
of the message, n, to test the limits of the amount of information that can be effectively hidden
inside a cover image. This corresponds to the number of bits per pixel (bpp) that can be hidden by
a steganographic algorithm, a common measure of the success of a steganographic research. On
average, steganographic algorithms can successfully hide approximately 0.4bpp. Our datasets are
formed of 32 × 32 pixel images, and so we vary n from 100 to 400, this corresponds to hiding
between approximately 0.1bpp to 0.4bpp. We intentionally randomize the secret message so that the
network does not learn a specific function associated with a specific group of messages. We want to
be sure that our model can generalize to any message that is less than n bits3. For each experiment,
we performed grid search to find the optimum loss weights, λA, λB , λE , for Alice. All experiments
in this section were performed in TensorFlow [1, 3], on a workstation with a Tesla K40 GPU card4.
4.1 CelebA dataset
We first motivate our work by showing our model can produce steganographic images that are almost
indistinguishable from the cover images. We vary the size of the embedded secret message, to explore
how many bits may be stored in a cover image while remaining undetected by a steganalyzer. As
expected, we find that a larger perturbation in the cover image results in more communicated bits but
carries a greater risk of detection.
The celebA dataset consists of 202, 599 images of celebrity faces from 10, 177 unique identities. We
train in batches of 32, and use the Adam optimizer [11] with a learning rate of 2 · 10−4. At each
batch we alternate training either Alice and Bob, or Eve.
Figure 2b and Figure 2c show the steganographic images output by Alice after 150 training steps, for
embedding rates of 0.1bpp and 0.4bpp, respectively. Our scheme easily copes with an embedding
rate of 0.1bpp for a 32 × 32 image, which is equivalent to communicating a short 12 character
ASCII message. Figure 3a and Figure 3c shows the training loss of each model, and the success
of Bob decoding the secret message over time, respectively. In the first few rounds of training, the
visual quality of Alice’s output is low and Bob is essentially randomly guessing the message. After
approximately 30 steps, Alice learns to successfully embed information in a cover image such that
Eve is fooled, and Bob learns to correctly decode the message. After 150 training steps, Bob decodes
the message with an average success of 100%, while Eve’s loss remains the same. Figure 3b and
Figure 3d show similar results, with both sample quality and success of decoding both high by the end
of training. Concealing 0.4bpp corresponds to successfully hiding a message of 51 ASCII characters.
Due to the larger amount of information communicated between Alice and Bob, it takes a longer
period of time for Alice to discover an effective embedding scheme, and for Bob to correctly discover
the secret message. After 150 training steps, Bob can successfully decode 100% of the message.
There is no noticeable image quality decrease between 0.1bpp and 0.4bpp, however we found after
0.4bpp, image quality suffered and it was no longer possible to balance realistic image creation
capable of fooling Eve, and convergence of message decoding. For both embedding rates of 0.1bpp
and 0.4bpp, Eve’s loss remained constant at approximately 1.4. Eve’s loss is the sum of losses on
both steganographic images and cover images, which both remained steady at approximately 0.69.
Due to the logarithmic term in the loss function, this is equivalent to randomly guessing if an image
carries a secret message.
4.2 BOSS dataset
In addition to our experiments on the celebA dataset, we trained our steganographic scheme on the
BOSS image dataset, which is commonly used as a benchmark in steganography research. BOSS
is made up of 10, 000 grayscale images depicting a variety of scenes such as landscapes, buildings
and animals. We expected our scheme to perform worse than on the celebA dataset, since the cover
2http://agents.fel.cvut.cz/boss/index.php?mode=VIEW&tmpl=materials
3This ensures our scheme can embed ciphertexts of messages, which appear as random strings.
4Source code will be made available.
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(a) Cover images of buildings, birds, skies and the
ocean.
(b) Steganographic images (0.1bpp).
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(c) Alice, Bob and Eve error for 0.1bpp.
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(d) Bob decoding success for 0.1bpp.
Figure 4: Results on BOSS dataset at an embedding rate of 0.1bpp.
images do not come from a single distribution. However, we found our scheme is still capable of
embedding secret information successfully.
Figure 4b shows the sample quality of steganographic images with an embedding rate of 0.1bpp,
while Figure 4c and Figure 4d show the error rates of Alice, Bob and Eve, and the success of Bob
decoding the secret message, respectively. While image quality suffers slightly more than on the
celebA dataset, our scheme is still able to learn a steganographic algorithm. Our scheme is output
samples that are not dissimilar from the original dataset, while Bob is able to learn to successfully
decode the message. Alice and Bob both learn their respective tasks in a relatively short period of
time, after which there is not much improvement in terms of hiding or recovering the secret message.
At the end of training, Bob is able to successfully decode the secret message with 99.8% accuracy.
4.3 Comparison with related work
Fooling a steganalyzer, Eve, is easy by design, since we train in such a way that Eve never has a
significant competitive advantage. Thus, we additionally show that the resultant trained stegano-
graphic model, Alice, can fool an independent steganalyzer. We compare our scheme against
both state-of-the-art steganographic algorithms and steganalysis tools and show that it performs
competitively.
For both BOSS and CelebA, we compare our scheme against steganographic algorithms HUGO,
WOW and S-UNIWARD. Additionally, we implement the Eve model using supervised training and
compare against the steganalyzer ATS in Table 1. By design, Eve only performs slightly better than
random. One may wonder whether the choice of model for Eve is wise; why not use an established
steganalyzer in place of the Eve model? By training Eve in a supervised fashion, we show that Eve
has the capacity to become a strong steganalyzer, competing against established techniques like ATS,
and so is a good choice for the steganalyzer. Furthermore, Eve does not require a feature extraction
preprocessing step as with ATS, and, from our experiments, is an order of magnitude quicker to
train. For both the BOSS and CelebA datasets, we use 10, 000 samples and split in half, creating
a training set and a test set. Alice was then trained on the 5000 samples from the training set. We
then created an additional 10, 000 steganographic images for each steganographic algorithm (Alice,
HUGO, WOW and S-UNIWARD). Now each steganographic algorithm has an associated training
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Table 1: Accuracy of distinguishing between cover and steganographic images for the steganalyzers, Eve and
ATS, on the BOSS and CelebA datasets at an embedding rate of 0.4bpp.
BOSS CELEBA
STEGANOGRAPHIC ALGORITHM STEGANALYZER STEGANALYZER
ATS EVE ATS EVE
ALICE 0.83 0.79 0.95 0.90
HUGO 0.66 0.59 0.94 0.89
WOW 0.75 0.74 0.89 0.85
S-UNIWARD 0.77 0.72 0.91 0.84
set and test set, each consisting of 5000 cover images and 5000 steganographic images. For each
steganographic algorithm we train both ATS and Eve on the associated training set, and then report
accuracy of the steganalyzer on the test set. From Table 1, Eve performs competitively against the
steganalyzer, ATS, and Alice also performs well against other steganographic techniques. While
our scheme does not substantially improve on current popular steganographic methods, it is clear
that it does not perform significantly worse, and that unsupervised training methods are capable of
competing with expert domain knowledge.
4.4 Evaluating robust decryption
Due to the non-convexity of the models in the training scheme, we cannot guarantee that two separate
parties training on the same images will converge to the same model weights, and so learn the same
embedding and decoding algorithms. Thus, prior to steganographic communication, we require
one of the communicating parties to train the scheme locally, encrypt model information and pass
it to the other party along with information about the set of training images. This ensures both
parties learn the same model weights. To validate the practicality of our idea, we trained the scheme
locally (Machine A) and then sent model information to another workstation (Machine B) that
reconstructed the learned models. We then passed steganographic images, embedded by the Alice
model from Machine A, to Machine B, who used the Bob model to recover the secret messages.
Using messages of length corresponding to hiding 0.1bpp, and randomly selecting 10% of the CelebA
dataset, Machine B was able to recover 99.1% of messages sent by Machine A, over 100 trials; our
scheme can successfully decode the secret encrypted message from the steganographic image. Note
that our scheme does not require perfect decoding accuracy to subsequently decrypt the message.
A receiver of a steganographic message can successfully decode and decrypt the secret message if
the mode of encryption can tolerate errors. For example, using a stream cipher such as AES-CTR
guarantees that incorrectly decoded bits will not affect the ability to decrypt the rest of the message.
5 Discussion & conclusion
We have offered substantial evidence that our hypothesis is correct and machine learning can be
used effectively for both steganalysis and steganographic algorithm design. In particular, it is
competitive against designs using human-based rules. By leveraging adversarial training games,
we confirm that neural networks are able to discover steganographic algorithms, and furthermore,
these steganographic algorithms perform well against state-of-the-art techniques. Our scheme does
not require domain knowledge for designing steganographic schemes. We model the attacker as
another neural network and show that this attacker has enough expressivity to perform well against a
state-of-the-art steganalyzer.
We expect this work to lead to fruitful avenues of further research. Finding the balance between
cover image reconstruction loss, Bob’s loss and Eve’s loss to discover an effective embedding scheme
is currently done via grid search, which is a time consuming process. Discovering a more refined
method would greatly improve the efficiency of the training process. Indeed, discovering a method
to quickly check whether the cover image has the capacity to accept a secret message would be a
great improvement over the trial-and-error approach currently implemented. It also became clear
that Alice and Bob learn their tasks after a relatively small number of training steps, further research
is needed to explore if Alice and Bob fail to improve due to limitations in the model or because of
shortcomings in the training scheme.
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